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Abstract
This article assesses that tax administra-
tions- likewise the Colombian tax authority- 
has been facing difficulties to audit transfer 
pricing transactions with intangibles, be-
cause the current transfer pricing rules are not 
adapted to the new digital economy or e-com-
merce cross borders transactions. Therefore, 
the mnes take advantage of the flexibility of 
the transfer pricing rules reducing their tax 
liability by income shifting using intangibles. 
The article analyzes the income shifting prac-
tices using intangibles, and the reasons why 
the arm’s length standard does not work well 
at all and cannot avoid appropriately mnes’ 
income shifting and base erosion.
I. Introduction
The Colombian Minister of Finance, Mau-
ricio Cardenas, aforesaid that tax evasion 
affects the ability of governments to work 
for the welfare of their citizens; he reiterated 
the importance for developing countries of 
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fighting against tax evasion (oecd, Minis-
terial Council Meeting, 2015). The signifi-
cance of transfer pricing and its impact on 
the tax collections of tax administration has 
brought this subject to the forefront of inter-
national tax debates. Basically, the govern-
ments of countries involved in expanding 
international trade are competing with each 
other to allocate taxable profits of mnes into 
their jurisdictions (Lowell & Briger, 2014).
The multinational enterprises (“mnes”) 
embody a large proportion of global Gross 
Domestic Product, and the intra-firm trade 
represents an increasing proportion of over-
all trade (oecd, Action Plan on Base Ero-
sion and Profit Shifting, 2014). The arm’s 
length standard literature demonstrates that 
the weakness of all transfer pricing regimes 
includes intangible related transactions and 
debt financing, yet this paper is focused in 
more detail on the study of the intangible 
transactions and their implications in the 
tax avoidance. 
The intangible property is mostly important 
for mnes as they obtain a significant portion 
of their income from it. The current transfer 
pricing rules are not properly adapted to the 
new digital economy as they were not de-
signed to regulate intangibles or e-commerce 
cross borders transactions (Brauner, What the 
Beps?, 2014). Under the arm’s length regime 
the valuation of intangibles results in high 
level of compounded inaccuracy (Brauner, 
2008). The mnes take advantage of the flex-
ibility of the transfer pricing rules reducing 
their tax liability by income shifting (Noked, 
2014), which could be defined as the way in 
which mnes legally reduce their tax liability 
locating profitable functions and accumulat-
ing income in low tax jurisdictions.
The Colombian tax authority, Directorate 
of National Taxes and Customs, hereinafter 
dian, has been facing difficulties to audit 
transfer pricing transactions, likewise other 
national tax administrations. The Base Ero-
sion and Profits Shifting projects (“beps”) 
provide governments with new tools to battle 
against tax avoidance such as “Country-By-
Country Reporting”.
Colombia has adopted the arm’s length 
standard in its national legislation. The third 
principle of beps states the concern about in-
novative solutions even when they conflict 
with the traditional premises of the current 
international tax regime. For that reason, this 
paper analyzes, first, the actions established 
specifically for intangibles in beps, and, 
second, some of the solutions provided by 
the literature, which are in accordance with 
the international accepted principle arm’s 
length standard. 
In this paper we prove that all solutions 
to be raised in Colombia against income 
shifting must be done from the oecd frame-
works, since there is precedent of the Co-
lombian Constitutional Court to recognize 
the guidelines of the oecd as auxiliary cri-
teria of interpretation. Moreover, the solu-
tions proposed in the literature also should 
be analyzed from the arm’s length standard. 
The paper proceeds as fallow: Part i sets 
the definition and the origin of transfer pric-
ing rules so as to explain the reasons of their 
importance in the international tax system. 
Part ii analyzes the definition, origin and 
international adoption of the arm’s length 
standard rules in turn to demonstrate what 
the role that Colombia plays in the interna-
tional tax community is and why the dian’s 
approaches to fight against tax avoidance and 
base erosion behaviors should come from 
the arm’s length standard and the oecd’s 
transfer pricing guidelines and frameworks. 
In this part, it will be confirmed that the 
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implementation of the arm’s length standard 
in Colombia is a result of its international 
development, and the reasons why the dian 
must remain applying the oecd’s transfer 
pricing frameworks will be explained. 
Part iii analyzes the income shifting prac-
tices using intangibles, and the reasons why 
the arm’s length standard does not work 
well at all and cannot avoid properly mnes’ 
income shifting and base erosion. These situ-
ations propitiated the current international 
environment of awareness of the require-
ment to implement new practical anti-tax 
avoidance tools. 
The theoretical analysis of the income 
shifting practices is followed by the solu-
tions provided by the oecd in beps to fight 
against tax avoidance using intangibles in 
Part iv. The oecd come with a new ap-
proach, and its new instrument is the “Coun-
try-By-Country Reporting”, which will be 
useful for the dian to improve its audit pro-
cedure and the compliance of mnes taxpay-
ers. Similarly, the reporting will be helpful 
to achieve a comprehensive analysis of the 
information provided by multinationals. 
Although Colombia must remain in the 
oecd frameworks, the paper finalizes, in 
Part v, with the consideration of additional 
solutions against income shifting and base 
erosion behaviors, which came from out-
side of the traditional perspective of the 
oecd. Implementing these alternative tools 
by dian would happen after a thorough study 
of their convenience from the legal and eco-
nomic points of view. Firstly, the formulary 
apportionment approach, which its propo-
nents argue that, would reduce mnes ability 
to use transfer pricing to locate their taxable 
income in low-tax countries (Morse, 2010). 
Finally, the possible inclusion of a method-
ology such as recharacterizing intra-group 
equity investments as a type of long-term 
subordinated debt.
II. Transfer Pricing
1. Definition 
Transfer pricing refers to the pricing of 
transaction between related entities for 
goods, services, intangible property, rents 
and loan. The transfer pricing determines 
the division of total profit between the re-
lated entities. As market forces do not cer-
tainly control transactions prices within a 
related group, several countries have enacted 
transfer pricing rules and improved enforce-
ments efforts to prevent the use of transfer 
price to shift income of their tax jurisdiction. 
However, transfer pricing rules are complex 
in their application and non-uniform, usu-
ally resulting in compliance difficulties on a 
global basis (Levey & Wrappe, 2013). 
Currently, transfer pricing plays an im-
portant role in an international tax system. 
One of the most significant current business 
and tax concerns for mnes it is the way in 
which prices assets, such as the results of 
research and capital transferred to their re-
lated entities. The transfer pricing policies 
and practices used in connection with the 
transfer of goods, services, and intangibles 
from one affiliated corporation to another 
across borders have more impact on which 
governmental jurisdiction taxes the income 
generated from international transactions 
than any other aspect of the tax law (Lowell 
& Briger, 2014). 
2. Origin 
Transfer pricing was firstly created as a 
managerial accounting concept in the u.s, 
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instead of a tax concept. The transfer pric-
ing could be traced back to the nineteenth 
century, when some companies devolved 
into multi-segment businesses, in which 
managers were faced with the need to price 
intercompany transactions to better reflect 
the profitability of each segment and maxi-
mize the overall profitability of the firm. 
Coherent with this accounting point of view, 
transfer pricing is defined as “the amount 
charged by one segment of an organization 
for product or service that it supplies to 
another segment of the sane organization 
(Levey & Wrappe, 2013).” 
With the rise of mnes, developing a mech-
anism to clearly reflect the income attribut-
able to controlled entities under different 
national jurisdictions to prevent tax avoid-
ance and double taxation was needed from 
the tax law perspective. To achieve it, the 
tax authorities have adopted the transfer 
pricing concept to guarantee that they are 
taxable on the true taxable income in each 
tax jurisdiction. Without transfer pricing 
rules, mnes could be permitted to use trans-
fer pricing to shift large amounts of income 
from one tax jurisdiction to another (Levey 
& Wrappe, 2013). 
III. Arm’s Length Standard
1. Definition 
The arm’s length standard requires that 
intercompany prices be set as if the related 
parties were independent unrelated parties. 
For many decades, governments and taxpay-
ers have struggled to define the arm’s length 
standard in actual operations (Lowell & 
Briger, 2014). In this subchapter, we clarify 
the definition of the arm’s length standard 
adopted by the U.S regulations, oecd Model 
Tax Convention and Colombian legislation 
in order to determine if the standard is appli-
cable by the same way in the three normative 
bodies. However, we should keep in mind 
that Colombia must remain in the oecd’s 
transfer pricing frameworks. 
In the United States, the first definition of 
the arm’s length standard is not included in 
the text of Internal Revenue Code (Section 
482), yet it has been included in Treasury 
Regulation since 1935, which has been the 
basis of the development of all transfer regu-
lation since that time (Levey & Wrappe, 
2013). The arm’s length standard requires 
that a controlled taxpayer realizes the same 
results from their controlled transactions as 
would have been realized if an uncontrolled 
taxpayer had engaged in the same transac-
tion under the same circumstances. (Treas. 
Reg. § 1.482–1 (b)(1)). 
On the other hand, the article 9 of oecd 
Model Tax Convection, defines arm’s length 
standard as [When] conditions are made 
or imposed between (…) two enterprises 
in their commercial or financial relations 
which differ from those which would be 
made between independent enterprises, then 
any profits which would, but for those condi-
tions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, 
but, by reason of those conditions, have not 
so accrued, may be included in the profits 
of that enterprise and taxed accordingly 
(ocde, Transfer Princing Guidelines, 2010). 
This article and almost all tax treaties of 
the United States, which contain articles in 
transfer pricing (in the associated enterprise 
articles) implicitly endorse the arm’s length 
standard, although the term is not actually 
used (Lowell & Briger, 2014). 
The arm’s length prices “is the assump-
tion that each affiliated company within 
the group transacts with the other members 
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of the group in the same way that it would 
transact if the members were unrelated. ( 
Avi-Yonah, Clausing , & Durst, 2009)”. The 
arm’s length standard is, in some extent, 
a fiction, in that attempts to measure the 
value of a transaction “as if” the parties had 
dealt with each other in an unrelated third 
party transaction. The oecd Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines are generally consistent with the 
u.s. transfer pricing regulations. The prob-
lems with the arm’s length standard arise, 
among others, because it ignores certain 
efficiencies and economies of scale from 
operating related business that would not 
exist if the parties were not related (Levey 
& Wrappe, 2013). 
As the same approach as oecd and the u.s. 
legislation, the Colombian Tax Code defines 
the arm’s length standard as “in which a 
transaction between related parties fulfill the 
conditions which would have been utilized 
in comparable transactions with or between 
independent parties. In this framework, as 
we see below, Colombia is no stranger to the 
international context in the application of the 
arm’s length standard, and its Tax Adminis-
tration may be facing the same difficulties 
with the enforcement of the standard, and 
then she should make an additional effort 
to provide clear rules related to the appli-
cation of transfer pricing, and its use for 
mnes to shift income in the Colombian tax 
jurisdiction. 
2. Origin and International Adoption 
i. The United States
In words of Professor Avi-Yonah, “Trans-
fer pricing manipulation is one of the sim-
plest ways to avoid taxation” (Avi-Yonah , 
The rise and Fall of arm’s length: A study 
in the evolution of u.s. international taxa-
tion, 1995). In consequence, the predeces-
sors of section 482 of the Code (Lowell & 
Briger, 2014) were “designed to combat 
such manipulation, date back almost as far 
as the modern income tax itself” (Lowell 
& Briger, 2014). (Yonah,1995) The arm’s 
length language has never been included in 
the statutory language of Section 482, nei-
ther in its beginning with the War Revenue 
Act of 1917, Section 240 of the Revenue Act 
of 1921, 7 and Section 45 of the Revenue Act 
of 1928 (Section 45). 
The arm’s length language first arose in 
the initial regulations published under Sec-
tion 45 of the Revenue Act of 1928 in 1935 
(actually, then Section 45 of the Revenue Act 
of 1934) (Lowell & Briger, 2014). The statu-
tory predecessor to Code Section 482 was 
enacted in 1928, allowing broad authority 
to the Commissioner of the IRS to allocate 
gross income, deductions and credits and 
other items between and among controlled 
taxpayers in order to prevent, in part, be-
cause of the tax avoidance opportunities 
afforded by possession corporations, which 
were ineligible to file consolidated returns 
with their domestic affiliates. Subsequently, 
in 1934, regulations applying arm’s length 
standard as a method of reallocation under 
the predecessor to Code Section 482 were 
issued (Avi-Yonah , The rise and Fall of 
arm’s length: A study in the evolution of u.s. 
international taxation, 1995). For thirty-five 
years, until 1968, there were no significant 
changes made to U.S. transfer pricing rules, 
when the irs promulgated comprehensive 
regulations that restated that the arm’s length 
standard is the basic guiding principle of all 
the transfer analyses and described specific 
pricing methods to test the arm’s length na-
ture of transfer pricing (Levey & Wrappe, 
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2013). The arm’s length standard was rati-
fied in the 1993 proposed regulations and in 
the 1994 final regulations. 
In the Revenue Act of 1962 the House 
of Representatives proposed a formulary 
approach similar the one which is used for 
the multi-state income apportionment in the 
U.S. The proposal was intended to arrange 
the difficulties of transfer of business activi-
ties by u.s. companies to their subsidiaries 
in low-tax jurisdictions. The proposal none-
theless was not enacted, it was important as 
the Treasury was invited to re-examine its 
existing regulations with particular focus 
on guidelines and formulas for the alloca-
tion of income and deductions (Levey & 
Wrappe, 2013). 
ii. oecd and International Adoption 
The oecd first issued its transfer pric-
ing guidelines in 1979. In 1995 and again 
in 2009, the oecd substantially revised its 
Guidelines in Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprise periodically. 
The oecd’s guidelines are based on the prin-
ciples concerning taxation of multinational 
enterprises that are incorporated in the oecd 
Model Tax Convention. As we said before, 
the arm’s length standard has been adopted 
by the oecd, under the believe that the stan-
dard provides the closest approximation of 
the working of the open market where goods 
and services are transferred between related 
parties (Levey & Wrappe, 2013). Contrary, 
the Guidelines conclude that global for-
mulary apportionment approach is not a 
no legitimate or realistic alternative to the 
arm’s length standard. The global formu-
lary apportionment approach is discussed 
in Chapter I of the guidelines, as follows: 
Global formulary apportionment, sometimes 
mentioned as a possible alternative, would 
not be acceptable in theory, implementation, 
or practice. (ocde, 2010).
The oecd countries have used the arm’s 
length standard in their formulation. Fur-
thermore, the standard has been almost uni-
versally adopted as the international pricing 
standard, and has been adopted by the leg-
islative or regulatory bodies in most other 
countries, in which Colombia is included 
(Lowell & Briger, 2014). The result of the 
global enforcement environment makes 
transfer pricing one of the main areas for 
MNEs enterprises with taxpayers designat-
ing more resources to effectively address 
transfer pricing planning, compliance, and 
audits by tax authorities (Levey & Wrappe, 
2013). 
The fact that the arm’s length standard 
should be the international pricing touch-
stone does not appear to be under any grave 
dispute, while in the United States the man-
ner of determining whether the standard 
has been satisfied has been the subject of 
intense debate in the past few years (Lowell 
& Briger, 2014). Respected international tax 
scholars and former Treasury officials have 
concluded that the arm’s length standard is 
simply unworkable and thus concluded that 
any proposed solutions to the hi/beps (Well 
& Cym, 2014) problem must come from 
outside of the arm’s length standard (Mund-
stock, 2012) (Morse, 2010) and (Altshuler 
& Grubert, 2010). Nevertheless, accord-
ingly to the current Colombian legislation 
and its international context, the solutions 
would come inside the arm’s length stan-
dard, and these solutions should be in ac-
cordance with the oecd Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines. 
According to the opinion of Bret Wells 
& Cym Lowell “The mere existence of the 
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hi/beps problem itself could be viewed as 
providing sufficient evidence for a prima 
facie case that the arm’s length standard is 
deficient. MNEs argue that their tax plan-
ning and use of low-tax foreign subsidiaries 
“comply with U.S. and foreign tax laws.” 
Legislators and scholars alike respond that 
the existence of the hi/beps problem pro-
vides compelling evidence that the arm’s 
length standard does not and cannot defend 
against inappropriate income shifting to tax 
havens.” Nonetheless, the tax authorities 
likewise dian, are obligated to find alterna-
tive and practical tools to fight against in-
come shifting practices as soon as possible. 
iii. Colombia 
In comparison to the u.s., the Colombian 
legal transfer pricing tradition is almost re-
cent as the first code sections related with 
this matter were just promulgated until 2002 
by the Congress of the Republic. (Gazette 
No. 45, 046, 2002). Afterward, the first ver-
sion of the Chapter xi of Title I of the Tax 
Code, which contains the code sections of 
transfer pricing rules from Article 260-1 to 
260-11, was newly modified in 2012 uphold-
ing the same principles previously enacted. 
(Law 1607 of 2012). 
As we saw before, Colombia has adopted 
the arm’s length standard in Article 260-1 
to support fiscal relations between mnes 
and foreign tax administrations in the area 
of transfer pricing (dian, 2012). The oecd 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines are legally 
recognize as auxiliary criteria of interpre-
tation by the Constitutional Court. (Deci-
sion C-690 of 2003) In that sense, the oecd 
Guidelines are mandatory frameworks that 
taxpayers and the dian must follow to ac-
complish the legal transfer pricing require-
ments. Therefore, all possible solutions and 
internal reforms attacking income shifting 
and tax avoidance practices would be ex-
plored and enacted accordingly to the arm’s 
length standard, in order to be agreed with 
the judicial decision of the Constitutional 
Court and the oecd policies. 
As the same approach as the oecd Trans-
fer Pricing Guidelines, which are consis-
tent with the Code Section 482 regulations 
(Levey & Wrappe, 2013), the Colombian 
rules state the elements to apply the arm’s 
length standard as well, as fallow: 
– Factors determining the comparability 
are described in Article 260-4 (characteristic 
of property or services, functional analysis, 
contractual terms, economic circumstances 
and business strategies).
– Arm’s length range (oecd, Transfer pric-
ing Guidelines for multinational Enterprises 
and Tax Administration, 2010) is define in 
Article 260-3 of the Colombian Tax Code 
and Article 8 of Decreto 3030 of 2013 (De-
creto 3030 of 2013, article 8). Consistent with 
Code Section 482, the ocde Guidelines state 
that if the taxpayer cannot show that the re-
sult of the related party transaction falls with-
in the range, and adjustment should be made 
to any point within the arm’s length range.
– Use of transfer methods is explained in 
Article 260-3 of the Colombian Tax Code. 
In contrast with the Code Section 482, the 
ocde Guidelines and Colombian law do not 
require either the tax examiner or the taxpay-
er to perform analyses under more than one 
method or prove that the particular method 
does not apply (e.g. there is no best method 
rule.) (Levey & Wrappe, 2013)
Likewise the oecd in its Guidelines, the 
dian argues in its Transfer Pricing Guide-
lines that the application of arm’s length 
promotes the growth of international trade 
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and investment making equitable tax treat-
ment to MNEs and independent enterpris-
es, since related and unrelated companies 
are in equal conditions for tax purposes, 
avoiding the creation of any advantage 
that could distort the competitive position 
of any firm. Moreover, the Tax Authority 
concludes that the purpose of the transfer 
pricing regime is offset the artificial prices 
that may occur between related entities to 
prevent the transfer of profits from high-
tax level to low-tax jurisdictions or tax 
havens (dian, 2012). Nonetheless, these 
arguments appear ingenuous and lack of 
accuracy in the contemporary international 
context, which has been analyzed by schol-
ars who conclude that the arm’s length 
standard does not successfully benchmark 
transactions within multinational compa-
nies (Avi-Yonah, Clausing, & Durst, 2009). 
Similarly, beps recognize that the aggres-
sive transfer pricing is their beating heart 
(Brauner, 2014), and its third principle is 
the adoption of innovative solutions against 
base erosion and income shifting (oecd, 
Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting, 2014). 
A comprehensive analysis of the Colom-
bian transfer pricing legislation is beyond 
the scope of this paper, yet it is important 
to remark that these transfer pricing rules 
introduce a significant impact in the quan-
tification of the companies income tax, as 
intragroup debts, costs and deductions are 
not subject to the limitations of cost and 
deductions established regularly on related 
parties. Article 124-1 of Colombian Tax 
Code states that interests payable to parent 
companies from Colombian subsidiaries are 
not deductible, however, upon a transaction 
is regulated by transfer pricing norms, the 
subsidiary is able to take the interest deduc-
tion at arm’s length, which open a great op-
portunity for aggressive tax planning. 
Additionally, it is substantive observable 
that Colombian transfer pricing legislation 
lacks of any anti avoidance rule exclusively 
for intangibles, such as the “commensurate 
with income” of Section 482 and 367(d) 
or from a different approach. Nonetheless, 
instead of having special rule to attack the 
possible tax avoidance behaviors with intan-
gibles by mnes, we have enacted a regula-
tion for cost sharing agreements, (Decreto 
3030 of 2013, article 6) which are “gener-
ous” to tax payers (Brauner, 2014). The 
Colombian Tax Administration is not com-
pletely aware of the aggressive tax practices 
that mnes might do with intangibles, and a 
prompt response is absolutely necessary.
Article 319-2 of the Tax Code states that 
all intangible contributions to companies or 
other foreign organizations shall be reported 
in the proxy statement transfer pricing, re-
gardless of the amount of the contribution. 
The regulation (Decreto 3030 of 2013.), says 
that the contributions in kind and contribu-
tions in industry by natural persons, legal en-
tities or Colombian entities or other entities 
shall be considered as a sale to foreign enti-
ties for tax purposes, which will be subject 
to transfer pricing regime. Consequently, 
the questions that arise from the previous 
rules are: first, what should the tax approach 
to evaluate properly the deemed sale of the 
intangible be?; Second, what should the 
treatment and the quantification of the fu-
ture royalties from transferred high-val-
ue intangibles such as patents, copyrights, 
trademarks, and unpatented know-how be? 
-Commensurate with income from the u.s. 
perspective. 
Besides, in my opinion another prob-
lematic issue is the proper valuation of 
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the intra-group royalties that are payable 
from Colombian entities to their related 
foreign entities for the use of licensed 
intangibles, which are characterized as 
deduction and cost. That common prac-
tice might be a simple manner to erode 
the income tax base. In the literature, a 
customary alternative answer different 
from the arm’s length standard to solve 
the difficulties to valuation of intangibles 
is the formula-based regime or formulary 
apportionment (Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, 
2011). In addition, one the oecd’s solu-
tions is the country-by-country reporting 
(oecd, Country-by-Country Reporting 
Implementation Package, 2015). Those 
solutions will be analyzed in Chapter iv 
and v of this paper.
IV. Criticism of Arm’s Length Standard 
and its Relation with the Income Shift-
ing
Currently, policymakers, theorists, and 
practitioners consider the arm’s length stan-
dard based transfer pricing the most critical 
problem in international taxation and in the 
income taxation of mnes’ income. This is a 
consequence of the intrinsic deficiency of 
the arm’s length standard in breaking down 
related-party transactions and the manner 
in which this difficulty plays out in the 
more complex tax-competition dynamic 
between countries and investors (Bensha-
lom, 2013).
1. What is Income Shifting?
In its basic form, income shifting is a man-
ner in which mnes legally reduce their tax li-
ability, when they locate profitable functions 
and accumulate income in low tax jurisdic-
tions – as Ireland, Luxembourg and other 
known jurisdictions - for purpose of tax 
avoidance, whereas conducting the fewer 
profitable activities and reporting little ex-
penses in high-tax jurisdictions –as much 
The United States-. Commonly, intellectual 
property income shifting generally involves 
the transfer of intellectual property through 
a sale, licensing, or a cost-sharing agree-
ment, which is, for instance, as result of an 
agreement between the u.s. parent and a 
subsidiary or an affiliate to share the costs 
of developing an intangible. Intellectual 
property income shifting represents a large 
portion of the overall income-shifting tax 
planning (Noked, 2014).
For tax reporting purposes each corpo-
ration within the mne group, which is a 
separate legal entity that can freely contract 
with other entities, should keep separate 
books and be taxed only on its income, and 
then each corporation needs to allocate the 
profits derived from related transactions to 
the contractual setting designed by the mne. 
Therefore, under separate accounting, each 
independent structure of intra-group trans-
actions should be respected, yet intra-group 
transactions among mne affiliates should be 
priced as if made with unrelated parties -at 
arm’s length (Noked, 2014). 
The arm’s length standard creates a clear 
incentive to earn profits in low-tax coun-
tries - from the Colombian perspective such 
as Panama, and recently other countries 
of Central America-. mnes locate real ac-
tivities (jobs, assets, production) in low-tax 
countries, and then, respond with various 
legal and accounting techniques to shift 
profits to these low-tax locations, dispropor-
tionately to the scale of business activities 
in such locations (Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, 
2011). 
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Prof. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah provides some 
examples of mnes income shifting performs, 
as fallow: 
There are multiple such ways to shift in-
come to subsidiaries in low-tax countries. 
For example, it may be advantageous for 
multinational firms to alter the debt/equity 
ratios of affiliated firms in high and low-
tax countries in order to maximize interest 
deductions in high-tax countries and tax-
able profits in low-tax countries. […] For 
example, firms can follow a strategy of 
under- (over-) pricing intra-firm exports 
(imports) to (from) low-tax countries, fol-
lowing the opposite strategy with respect 
to high-tax countries. The most powerful 
of such techniques typically involve the 
transfer of interests in intangible property, 
such as patents, copyrights and trade-
marks as well as unpatented know-how, 
to subsidiaries in low-tax countries. (Avi-
Yonah & Benshalom, 2011) 
2. Why The Arm’s Length Standard Can-
not Avoid mnes’ Income Shifting?
It is necessary to assess how mnes operate 
and why their business model has become 
so predominant and effective in the last two 
decades, to understand why the arm’s length 
standard imposes a structural limitation on 
the sourcing of MNEs’ income and cannot 
yield practical results (Avi-Yonah & Ben-
shalom, Formulary Apportionment-Myths 
And Prospects: Promoting Better Interna-
tional Tax Policies By Utilizing The Misun-
derstood And Under-Theorized Formulary 
Alternative, 2011).
First, mne groups appear precisely in order 
to elude the inefficiencies that arise when 
unrelated companies must transact with one 
another at arm’s length. Basically, mnes 
arise due to organizational and internaliza-
tion advantages relative to the efforts of un-
related, separate companies that seek to do 
business with one another. These advantages 
consist of that within mnes, profit is gener-
ated in part by internalizing transactions 
within the firm. Hence, for firms that are 
truly integrated across borders, holding relat-
ed entities within the commonly controlled 
group to an “arms-length” standard for the 
pricing of intercompany transactions does 
not make sense, nor does allocating income 
and expenses on a country-by-country basis 
(Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, 2011).
mnes have a significant performance in 
those industries in which the ability to in-
tegrate functions in different jurisdictions 
enables them to reduce certain costs through 
synergy that takes advantage of economics 
of scope and scale. These costs include re-
search and development costs, transaction 
costs, information-obtaining costs, manage-
rial costs, and finance costs. The essence of 
the mne structure and an important source 
of profitability is the ability to efficiently in-
ternalize these costs. All mne entities, which 
are somehow involved with the activity that 
produces the benefits, contribute in some 
ways in this cost reduction process. Hence, 
the arm’s length standard cannot break down 
the cost of what unrelated parties would have 
done as the mne setting is designed spe-
cifically to save the costs of doing business 
through unrelated transactions (Avi-Yonah 
& Benshalom, 2011). 
Second, as we said before the permeabil-
ity of existing transfer pricing rules pro-
duces an artificial tax incentive to locate 
profits in low-tax countries, by locating 
real economic activities in such countries 
and by shifting profits toward more lightly 
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taxed locations. Tax authorities like dian 
require mnes to report their income in a 
way that breaks down the cost saving asso-
ciated with being a mne on an arm’s length 
basis. However, this requirement cannot be 
met, proved, or consistently enforced. This 
intrinsic vagueness motivates mnes to struc-
ture their affairs in a mode that reduces their 
tax costs (Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, 2011). 
Still, mnes are willing to employ ample re-
sources to defend their aggressive positions 
(Spencer, 2014). 
Finally, another reason is that the arm’s-
length standard was adopted in a simpler 
time, when the foreign operations of mnes 
were moderately self-contained in a foreign 
country and related party transactions were 
usually limited (Spencer, 2014).
V. bePs Solutions
1. Why bePs for transfers pricing  
for intangibles?
The tax avoidance has converted into a 
significant priority for the oecd (Noked, 
2014), which developing the beps ratifies 
the awareness of the income shifting and 
its negative effects in the national econo-
mies (oecd, Action Plan on Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting, 2014). The beps are a 
response from oecd to mnes, which have 
taken advantage of the globalization and 
the evolution of the tax regime, maximiz-
ing their tax planning by shifting income 
(Brauner, 2008). The mnes’ value is no lon-
ger restricted to brick and mortar assets, 
however is rather being driven by investment 
in intangible assets, in order to differenti-
ate them from their competitors. Therefore, 
mnes are investing more in developing in-
tangibles as a means of accessing higher 
returns, because they generate significant 
income (William, 2014). 
Transfer pricing rules apply to any transac-
tion, which involves a transfer of intangibles 
to a related party. For instance, the analy-
sis of the rules is required in any licensing 
agreement; in practically each international 
restructuring of groups of companies; in 
any intragroup agreements which include 
knowledge; research and development, man-
agement, organizational or production and 
manufacturing processes; and in the distribu-
tion agreements of tangible products where 
the value of the product depends on propri-
etary software (Brauner, 2008). 
The development of the intangible usually 
takes place in the United States, whereas 
the foreign affiliate only contributes with a 
portion of the development costs. That por-
tion could be a capital contribution, which 
is received by the subsidiary from its par-
ent. Moreover, the subsidiary is entitled to 
a portion of the profits from the intangible 
or to rights to exploit it, if the development 
is successful. For instance, the American 
tax rules state that when a u.s. Corporation 
sells an asset or licenses its use to a foreign 
affiliate, the sale price, or a royalty rate, must 
be reported based on the price or royalty that 
would be expected if the transaction had hap-
pened between the u.s. corporation and an 
unrelated party. Nonetheless, the application 
of those rules is problematic to situations 
wherein a u.s. company shifts the rights to 
its core intangible property to a foreign affili-
ate. Nonetheless, income-shifting systems 
work effectively for taxpayers whose prof-
its depend mainly on valuable intangibles 
(Noked, 2014).
Colombian companies are not signifi-
cant intangible property developers, yet its 
economy is growing, thus the income shift-
114
Juan Carlos Díaz García
Revista de Derecho Fiscal n.º 8 • enero-junio de 2016 • pp. 103-123
ing can be a plentiful problem in the near 
future. Therefore, it is necessary to learn 
from the United States and oecD’s experi-
ence to identify the transactions undertaken 
by mnes to reduce their taxable base. The 
dian lags behind what is referred as trans-
fer-pricing audit, and therefore she should 
tend to strengthen its international audit 
department, as she is not completely aware 
of international tax avoidance practices. 
Transfer -pricing rules based on arm’s 
length standard permit a variety of alterna-
tives and do not block intangible property in-
come shifting efficiently, because it is barely 
to find comparable transactions between 
unrelated parties and the value of assets de-
pends on projected cash flows and a discount 
rate to account for the associated risk. Es-
sentially, dian works with oecd guidelines; 
yet we can assume that it is not an effective 
labor, as we almost always lose the cases in 
the courts based on formal issues. 
The beps project, the oecd has estab-
lished three core principles as fundamental 
for international tax reform: (i) promote of 
collaboration rather than competition based 
solutions; (ii) take a systematic holistic view 
of the challenges and their corresponding so-
lutions rather than a competition-based para-
digm; and (iii) permit the consideration of 
innovative solutions even when they conflict 
with the traditional premises of the current 
international tax regime. The beps establish-
es a shift of the paradigm from the existing 
emphasis on competitiveness and the perfec-
tion of competition to a new collaborative 
international tax regime (Brauner, 2014). 
2. The oecd action plan
The oecd’s beps action plan includes 15 
action items with deadlines for delivery on 
September 15, 2014 or 2015, with a few re-
sidual issues scheduled for December 2015. 
Nevertheless, the objective of this chapter is 
to analyze the three action plans related to 
transfer pricing for intangibles, which are: 
1. Action Item one “Address the Tax Chal-
lenges of the Digital Economy”); 2. Action 
items eight through 10 (“Assure that Trans-
fer Pricing Outcomes Are in Line with Value 
Creation”) and; 3. Action Item 13 (“Re-
examine Transfer Pricing Documentation”).
i. Action item 1 (“Address the Tax Chal-
lenges of the Digital Economy”)
The mnes as business model can only be 
profitable by their substantial intangible con-
tent in the current digital economy (oecd, 
Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting, 2014). That significance of the in-
tangible property takes a relevant position in 
cross-border scenario. The digital economy 
has provided an advantage to mnes, and 
the largest mnes –as Apple, Microsoft and 
Google- have practiced aggressive tax plan-
ning schemes, which affect tax collection 
in the most important national economies 
(Brauner, 2014). 
In Action I the beps project addresses 
two issues related to e-commerce and in-
tangibles. First, the requirement of a dif-
ferent approach rather than the application 
of the old doctrine by analogy. Therefore, 
the oecd is aware of that physical presence 
cannot be the only trigger of tax jurisdiction, 
and then the Permanent Establishment (pe) 
rules need to be adjusted to this principle 
by a sophisticated approach. Nevertheless, 
Colombia has not taken an official position, 
as it is our belief that the oecd’s guidelines 
are infallible. On the other hand, the United 
States resists to a fundamental reconsidera-
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tion of the pe rules, because the belief is that 
it would affect principally American mnes. 
The United States might wish an Item 1 as a 
device against the most aggressive tax plan-
ning schemes (Brauner, 2014).
The second issue is the current difficulty 
to valuate intangibles under the arm’s length 
standard. However, the action plan relegates 
this aspect to items eight through ten which 
is the transfer pricing part of the plan. Once 
again, a more sophisticated approach is nec-
essary here as the valuation of intangibles 
is a challenging exercise because of their 
unique characteristics (Brauner, 2014). As 
we said before, Colombia applies the oecd 
frameworks, even the valuation methods, 
however, our tax authority has not thought 
about alternative methods yet, likewise a 
formulary method. 
The Action Item I claims that the cur-
rent tax rules were not designed for the new 
economy. Besides, it expresses some con-
cern about e-commerce and intangibles that 
require a different approach rather than the 
application of the principle of physical pres-
ence, and the need to develop another way to 
value the intangibles different from the old 
doctrine of the arm’s length principle. 
In my opinion, the dian is not entirely 
conscious of the relevance of the digital 
economy, and how it can be a source of new 
resources for the government. The dian 
should emphasize on creating conditions for 
taxpayers to comply with the obligations of 
revenues generated in the digital economy. 
ii. Action items 8 (“Assure that Transfer 
Pricing Outcomes Are in Line With Value 
Creation”)
An aggressive transfer pricing planning 
practice is the heart of beps project. When 
an intangible is exported to another tax juris-
diction it becomes difficult for the taxpayers 
to enhance a scheme that uses cost sharing 
to effectively export the aforesaid foreign 
rights in their intangible to a low-tax juris-
diction (oecd, Action Plan on Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting, 2014). Cost sharing is 
not an illegal practice, and shields quali-
fied taxpayers from the scrutiny of tax ad-
ministrations, mainly in the United States. 
When the intangible is located in the low-
cost tax jurisdiction, the mnes would build 
their business worldwide in a manner that 
would maximize the profits shifted to these 
low-tax jurisdictions at the expense of the 
countries where they operated using nu-
merous schemes (Brauner, What the Beps?, 
2014). The cost sharing agreement represents 
a potential problem for Colombia because it 
has not measured the consequences of its ap-
plication. Decreto 3030 of 2013, article 13).
The action transfer pricing item for intan-
gibles is number eight: Develop rules to pre-
vent beps by moving intangibles among group 
members. This will involve: (i) adopting a 
broad and clearly delineated definition of in-
tangibles; (ii) ensuring that profits associated 
with the transfer and use of intangibles are 
appropriately allocated in accordance with 
(rather than divorced from) value creation; 
(iii) developing transfer pricing rules or spe-
cial measures for transfers of hard-to-value 
intangibles; and (iv) updating the guidance 
on cost contribution arrangements (oecd, 
Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shift-
ing, 2014).
Because the arm’s length standard is the 
foundation of the international transfer pricing 
regime the taxpayer needs to find comparable 
market transactions between unrelated parties 
and imitate their pricing in the related party 
transactions (Brauner, 2008). The applica-
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tion of arm’s length standard permits flexibil-
ity and inaccuracy and creates an advantage 
in favor of the taxpayers subject to transfer 
pricing analysis (mnes) (Brauner, 2008). The 
dian deals with the complexity of the transfer 
pricing regime, hence we could claim audits 
were mostly on formal affairs, but we have 
been improving our techniques since 2012, 
when we have endeavored to make substan-
tial audits through the direct consultation of 
the oecd. 
Then, the oecd is promoting the principle 
of ensuring that profits associated with the 
transfer and use of intangibles are appropri-
ately allocated (profit split methodology) 
be in accordance with value creation. This 
principle is rudimentary, yet one can work 
with it (The Cost Approach to Valuation). 
This principle will not be easy to implement, 
as it might be inconsistent with some other 
language and current rules. Afterwards, the 
intangibles project seems to accept more 
of a central role for a profit split methodol-
ogy that is significantly formulary (Brauner, 
2008). In addition, the cost approach to valu-
ation uses expenditures into the valued in-
tangibles to construct their value assessment 
(Brauner, 2008). A technical definition cost 
approach to valuation is: 
The cost approach seeks to measure the fu-
ture benefits of ownership by quantifying 
the amount of money that would be required 
to replace the future service capability of the 
subject intellectual property. The assump-
tion underlying this approach is that the 
cost to purchase or develop new property 
is commensurate with the economic value 
of the service that the property can provide 
during its live. The cost approach does not 
directly consider the amount of economic 
benefit that can be achieved or the time 
period over which they might continue. 
This approach is often employed together 
with the assumption that economic benefits 
indeed exist and are sufficient amount and 
duration to justify the development expen-
diture. (Smith & Parr, 2006).
The application of the principle of col-
laboration is mandatory if the oecd wants 
to be successful in the implementation of the 
new methodology of evaluation, as the same 
formula must symmetrically apply to both 
borders of the transaction. It could help dian 
to improve the compliance of tax obligation 
by inspection and control.
iii. Action item 13 (“Re-examine Transfer 
Pricing Documentation”) 
The guidance from the Discussion Draft 
intended deep changes regarding transfer 
pricing documentation. First, reaffirming 
the general rule to demand, report, and ex-
change all information that is clearly use-
ful for tax inspection and control purpose, 
but not usually more than that. Moreover, 
coming up with two important innovations, 
which are: of (i) a master file containing 
standardized information relevant for all 
mne group members, and (ii) a local file re-
ferring specifically to material transactions 
of the local taxpayer (oecd, Discussion 
Draft on Transfer Pricing Documentation 
and cbc Reporting, 2014). Certainly, both 
two documents will be helpful for the dian 
to realize how the mnes are investing in 
Colombia with intangibles, and they the 
starting point for audit activities. Cur-
rently, the information presented does not 
follow any standard and its interpretation 
is often problematic for the government 
officers.
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First, the master file will include all the 
general required information about the 
structure and operations of the mne, its 
intangibles and its financial and tax po-
sitions, and must be accessible to all the 
Tax Administration of the country where 
the mne operates and that may have a tax 
claim over such mne’s income (Brauner, 
2014). The information in the master file 
would be organized into five categories: a) 
the mne group’s organizational structure; 
b) a description of the mne’s business or 
businesses; c) the mne’s intangibles; d) the 
mne’s intercompany financial activities; 
and e) the mne’s financial and tax positions. 
The section of the master file on financial 
and tax positions includes country-by-coun-
try reporting -hereinafter cbcr- of certain 
information relating to the global allocation 
of profits, the taxes paid, and certain indica-
tors of the location of the economic activity 
(tangible assets, number of employees and 
total employee expense) among countries 
in which the mne group operates. It also 
requires reporting of the capital and ac-
cumulated earnings as well as aggregate 
amounts of certain categories of payments 
and receipts between associated enterprises 
(oecd, Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing 
Documentation and cbc Reporting, 2014). 
Second, the local file will include infor-
mation about the relevant local entity or 
entities of the mne, information related to 
local transactions, and significant financial 
information. Further, this file will be avail-
able in a standard format with only the local 
information, in every relevant jurisdiction. 
Hence, each country might have the option 
to require additional reporting beyond the 
standard to complement the local file. Such 
information would include relevant finan-
cial information regarding those specific 
transactions, a comparability analysis and 
the selection and application of the most 
appropriate transfer pricing method for the 
fiscal year in question (oecd, Discussion 
Draft on Transfer Pricing Documentation 
and cbc Reporting, 2014). 
Standardizing affirms the principle of col-
laboration and allows a hand-to-hand effort 
by tax authorities to apportion tax jurisdic-
tions among them based on an agreed-upon 
baseline rather than competition based so-
lutions, which are inefficient incentives for 
both taxpayers and tax authorities to obscure 
information. Further, standardization is par-
ticularly helpful for governments that are 
weak in comparison to mne taxpayers and 
therefore may not alone be able to claim and 
compel fulfillment at a sufficient level. The 
standardization also is coherent with all three 
principles of beps: it is innovative, it is com-
prehensive, and it enhances collaboration 
rather than tax competition (Brauner, 2014).
Implementing cbrp is important for the sub-
stantive reasons of improving compliance and 
enforcement, but furthermore it may restore 
the confidence of the public in the interna-
tional tax regime which a key goal of the beps 
project, hence the significance of legitimacy 
(Brauner, 2014). 
The new taxes documentation is the most 
powerful instrument in the beps as Colom-
bian Tax Authority could audit deeply all 
taxpayers and encourage their compliance 
of taxpayers, which works with transfer 
pricing, because the information will have a 
comprehensive format. However, the preva-
lent argument in this regard is the disclosure 
of confidential information related to the 
intangible information, yet the Discussion 
Draft on Transfer Pricing Documentation es-
tablishes that the tax administrations should 
warrant the information (oecd, Discussion 
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Draft on Transfer Pricing Documentation 
and cbc Reporting, 2014), which is an is-
sue about dian has been criticized for in 
the past, like the allegation of revelation of 
private information. 
In conclusion, the beps are a breakthrough 
for controlling operations involving intan-
gibles. The beps will be useful for the dian’s 
audit activity and the compliance of tax-
payers, but also they will help to achieve a 
comprehensive analysis of the information 
provided by mnes. We strongly believe that 
the collection of taxes for this item will in-
crease from the time of its implementation, 
and will help to clarify what activities really 
involve intangibles as sometimes it is not 
clear for the dian.
3. oecd releases implementation package 
for beps Country-By-Country reporting
In October 15 of 2015 it was published the 
Final Report of the cbcr Implementation 
Package, which will facilitate a consistent 
and swift implementation of new transfer 
pricing reporting standards developed under 
Action 13 of the beps Action Plan, ensuring 
that tax administrations obtain a complete 
understanding of the way multinational en-
terprises structure their operations, while 
also ensuring that the confidentiality of such 
information is safeguarded (oecd, Transfer 
Pricing Documentation and Country-by-
Country Reporting action 13: 2015 Final 
Report, 2015).
The cbcr Implementation Package con-
tains Model Legislation and Multilateral 
Competent Authority Agreement on the Ex-
change of reports. 
The Model Legislation contained in the 
cbcr Implementation Package takes into 
account neither the constitutional law and le-
gal system, nor the structure and wording of 
the tax legislation of any particular jurisdic-
tion. Jurisdictions will be able to adapt this 
model legislation to their own legal systems, 
in which changes to current legislation are 
required. Instead, the Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters 
(the “Convention’) requires the Competent 
Authorities of the Parties to the Conven-
tion to mutually agree on the scope of the 
automatic exchange of information and the 
procedure to be complied with (oecd, oecd, 
2015).
cbcr is a key issue and it essential for more 
efficient tax enforcement, including enforce-
ment of the oecd’s arm’s-length standard. 
The cbcr (with combined reporting) is an 
essential factor for global formulary appor-
tionment and unitary taxation, which would 
require calculation of the worldwide income 
of each multinational, detailed information 
about its assets and activities in each rel-
evant jurisdiction, and the disclosure of that 
information, at least to the tax authorities of 
relevant jurisdictions. Hence, the adoptions 
of cbcr might be an important first step and 
facilitate the movement toward formulary 
apportionment and unitary taxation (Spen-
cer, 2014).
VI. Proposition of alternative tools
Although Colombia must remain in the 
oecd frameworks, this chapter analyzes 
alternative solutions that the Ministry of 
Finance and the dian would implement 
against income shifting and base erosion 
in the coming years, which may come from 
outside of the traditional perspective of the 
oecd. Implementing these alternative tools 
by dian would be encompassing with the 
international environment of the need of 
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inclusion of internal reforms to prevent all 
those practices that affect the tax collection, 
and it should occur after a broad study of 
their convenience from the legal and eco-
nomic point of view.
The third principle of beps claims the con-
sideration of innovative solutions even when 
they conflict with the traditional premises 
of the current international tax regime. That 
principle is promoting an alternative based 
transfer regime, beyond the arm’s length 
rhetoric. The language of the action items 
“hard-to-value intangibles,” implies that the 
current arm’s length-based transfer pricing 
regime is unable to regulate. However, the 
principle refuses to accept consideration of a 
replacement for the arm’s length-based sys-
tem at all (Brauner, 2014). This chapter con-
siders that Colombian policymakers should 
improve the arm’s length standard rather 
than abandon it altogether, because it is not 
broken beyond repair (Benshalom, 2013). 
1. Formulary apportionment approach
A recurrent solution in the literature is the 
formulary apportionment. In 1995, the US 
adopted new transfer pricing regulations that 
incorporated two new methods, the Compa-
rable Profit Method (cpm) and Profit Split, 
which relied much less on comparable (cpm 
uses comparability very loosely and in Profit 
Split the residual is not allocated based on 
comparable). The oecd followed suit and 
amended the Transfer Pricing Guidelines to 
include the new methods, which it calls the 
Transactional Net Margin Method (tnmm) 
and Profit Split, although in deference to 
opponents of formulary apportionment the 
oecd still rejected it and emphasized that the 
traditional methods were to be preferred to 
the new ones (oecd, Transfer Pricing Guide-
lines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations, 1995). It also changed the 
name cpm to tnmm to emphasize that it does 
not involve a global profit allocation but 
rather allocation for the particular transac-
tion, since the former is closer to formulary 
apportionment.
Prof. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah claims that it 
is clear that by moving beyond traditional 
comparability, the oecd was moving closer 
to accepting formulary apportionment (Avi-
Yonah & Benshalom, 2011). He believes 
that once you do not base the arm’s length 
standard on finding comparables, then it is 
not very significant to say that a particu-
lar method is or is not compatible with the 
ALS, as if there is no comparable it can-
not be proved that the result obtained by 
that method was not what unrelated parties 
would have done at arm’s length. That is 
why it is possible to argue that formulary 
apportionment is compatible with Article 7 
of the oecd model treaty, which focuses on 
the results that unrelated parties would have 
reached and permits in Art. 7(4) the use of 
formulas as long as the result is compatible 
with the arm’s length standard. 
Avi-Yonah suggests a new model where 
there is not comparable under the arm’s 
length standard. This method would be a ver-
sion of formulary apportionment, which, in 
essence, is a residual profit split with the re-
sidual split based on the u.s. traditional state 
formulary factors of payroll, tangible assets, 
and sales (Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, 2011).
Besides, he argues that these three com-
ponents are of course the traditional u.s. 
state formulary apportionment formula. 
This formula has confirmed to be remark-
ably efficacious, since in addition to the 
U.S. states, it is also the basis for the global 
dealing regulations in the u.s. and oecd, 
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and it is a leading candidate for the Com-
mon Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(ccctb) formula. He believes that it makes 
sense because each of its elements is ob-
jective (payroll and sales are transactions 
with outside parties, and while tangible 
assets depend on valuations, there is a lot 
of experience with asset based formulas, 
such as the u.s. interest allocation formula). 
Intangibles are excluded, but in his opinion 
that is appropriate because (a) their value 
results from physical and human capital 
and from the market and those elements are 
included, and (b) you cannot allocate their 
value and trying to include them invites 
manipulation. 
Moreover, he would propose that in hard 
transfer pricing cases, in which no compa-
rable can be found beyond the return on 
routine functions, the oecd endorses using 
the traditional three factor state formula to 
allocate the residual under the Profit Split 
method.
The dian and Colombian Ministry of 
Finance should carefully analyze this ap-
proach. In order to decide whether or not 
is viable to enforce unilaterally a formu-
lary apportionment; the Colombian gov-
ernment should attempt a legal analysis in 
the context of its international affairs with 
the oecd. 
2. Recharacterizing intra-group equity 
investments as a type of long-term subor-
dinated debt.
Professor Ilan Benshalom argues (Ben-
shalom, 2013), that the arm’s length standard 
literature demonstrates that the weakness of 
all transfer pricing regimes includes intan-
gible related transactions and debt financ-
ing. In his opinion, one of the main sources 
of weakness of the arm’s length standards is 
their failure to characterize intra-group eq-
uity investments, which are, by definition, 
“related” as long as they provide control over 
a subsidiary. That makes dividend payment 
discretionary, as parties can elect how and 
when to make them. This payment option is 
opposing to the arm’s length standard, which 
tries to prevent mnes from manipulating 
their tax liabilities by requiring them to price 
intra-group-related transactions as if made 
between unrelated parties.
The arm’s length standard creates an ambi-
guity, because tax authorities cannot enforce 
an unrelated setting on control-equity invest-
ments, as in a real market setting where there 
is a natural competition between parties, 
so no one would “just decide” to transfer 
dividends (money) to unrelated parties. As 
result, mnes take advantage from this ambi-
guity and design their financial structures in 
a tax-optimal way that permits them maxi-
mum control over the timing, character, and 
amount of intra-group payments.
The Professor suggests that the answer 
to intra-group equity investments might be 
establishing a policy that requires that the 
transfer be characterized as long-term sub-
ordinated debt. When one “unrelated” party 
transfers assets to another without any ex-
plicit collateral or guarantee of return, the 
transfer should be characterized as long-term 
subordinated debt. 
These interest payments should be im-
puted, because no interest payments may 
actually take place. The solution of how 
much, when, and what type of income (and 
deductions) should result from mnes’ in-
vestment transactions under an arm’s length 
standard framework. Financial markets are 
far from perfect in pricing interest rates, but 
they yet do so by relying on relatively well-
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known and easily observable features (e.g., 
overall leverage, cash flow, tangible assets, 
risk associated with commercial activities, 
and firm- and country-specific risks). Cor-
respondingly, tax authorities can accurately 
and almost costlessly determine the appro-
priate interest rate for long-term subordinat-
ed loans based on readily available market 
information. 
Finally, Benshalom concludes that this 
sourcing would improve the current system 
by using the arm’s length standard in a way 
that offers a more accurate accounting of the 
amount of income generated in each juris-
diction and would require that mnes more 
consistently time and characterize different 
payments. 
In this approach, we can arise at the same 
conclusion that the Colombian government 
should analyze prudently the option of imple-
menting tools which are not expressly con-
templated in the oecd frameworks, yet could 
harmonize with the arm’s length standard.
VII. Conclusions
The paper is demonstrating that the cur-
rent international transfer pricing rules are 
not appropriately adapted to the new digital 
economy. Under the arm’s length regime 
the valuation of intangibles results in a high 
level of compounded inaccuracy. 
Colombia is no stranger to the interna-
tional context in the application of the arm’s 
length standard, and its Tax Administra-
tion is facing the same difficulties with the 
enforcement of the arm’s length standard, 
thus, the DIAN could be confronting the same 
sophisticated tax avoidance methods of mul-
tinationals, which create an inequity when 
they shift their tax payments in low tax juris-
dictions. 
The paper has proven that the arm’s length 
standard is not workable, and we propose 
have some steps that can be taken by the dian. 
First, the implementation of beps’ tools, like 
“Country-by-Country Reporting Implemen-
tation Package”, will be useful for dian’s 
audit activity and the compliance of mnes 
taxpayers, but also they will help to achieve 
a comprehensive analysis of the information 
provided by mnes. However, the dian should 
make an additional effort to provide clear 
rules related to the application of transfer 
pricing, and its use by mnes to shift income 
from the Colombian tax jurisdiction.
Second, in the coming years the Colom-
bian government should carefully analyze 
the alternative approaches formulated by the 
literature to fight against income shifting and 
tax avoidance. So as to arise whether or not 
is viable to enforce unilaterally a formulary 
apportionment or the recharacterization of 
intra-group equity investments as a type of 
long-term subordinated debt -among other 
innovative possible solutions- the Colom-
bian government should attempt a deep legal 
and economic analysis, and try to figure out 
the possible consequences of that imple-
mentation. 
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